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AMENDING §524(G) TO SERVICE SEXUAL ABUSE MASS TORTS IN BANKRUPTCY
I.

Introduction
The Bankruptcy Code is designed to fairly resolve financial disputes. 1 The Code typically non-

financial interests to another area of resolution. 2 Asbestos cases are a rare scenario where the Code
accommodates special interests.3 Asbestos is a mineral used in common construction materials.4
It can cause inflammation, scaring, genetic damage, and cancer. 5 Asbestos was used in millions of
construction projects across the country; thus, millions of people risk exposure. 6 Asbestos
manufacturers faced litigating thousands of claims for an immeasurable amount of time. 7 Exposure
cases were inevitable and expected to continue for over thirty years. 8 Asbestos manufacturers were
financially incapable of paying judgments and continuing business.9 Eventually, litigation would
force manufacturer insolvency.
Bankruptcy courts responded by administering a trust-injunction mechanism as part of the
restructuring plan.10 The trust-injunction mechanism consists of two main parts: a trust
dispersing recovery to claimants; and an injunction barring personal injury claims brought
against the company.11 The mechanism benefited all parties. Manufacturers enjoyed reduced

1

Stephen J. Lubben, Fairness And Flexibility: Understanding Corporate Bankruptcy’s Arc, 23 U. Pa. J. of Bus. Aff.
132, 134 (2020)
2
Leaving it up to negotiation amongst the parties, discretion of the court, or resolution in another court.
3
11 U.S.C. §524(g)
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Daniel King, What is asbestos and how does it cause cancer?, Asbestos.com (last visited April 19, 2021),
https://www.asbestos.com/asbestos/
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Id.
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Mark D. Plevin, Leslie A. Epley, Clifton S. Elgarten, The Future Claims Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos
Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances, and Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 62
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 271, 271 (2006)
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Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 650 (2d Cir. 1988)
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liability and continued operation. Present claimants settled uniformly. Future claimants
maintained an opportunity to recover. But, since the mechanism was only court-administered,
litigants questioned its validity.12 Congress and added a new subsection to the code that provided
greater certitude.13 The new subsection only validated the trust-injunction as applied to asbestos
cases.14
Like parties in asbestos cases, parties in sexual abuse bankruptcies have special interests
deserving of concrete authority. Sexual abuse claimants have interests in closure, accountability,
lessening personal anguish, preventative reform, and adequate damages. Sexual abuse debtorcorporations have interests in of mitigating claims and distinctive obstacles in post-bankruptcy
survival.15 Unfortunately, the Code does not sufficiently serve the parties’ interests.
Bankruptcy is an efficient way for corporations to avoid insolvency due to mass tort
litigation.16 Tort claimants benefit from tortfeasor debt restructuring because it often preserves
some form of recovery for damages that otherwise go unsatisfied. The Code can provide special
protections when needed. Sexual abuse claimants need the same protection of a codified
resolution as enjoyed by asbestos claimants. Section 524(g) of the Code should include sexual
assault bankruptcies and add specific clauses protecting parties’ unique interests.

12

The power to create injunctive relief is typically provided through legislation. Critics questioned the court’s power
to shift liability.
13
Subsection (g) was added to 11 U.S.C. § 524
14
“The injunction is to be implemented in connection with a trust that, pursuant to the plan of reorganization -- (I) is
to assume the liabilities of a debtor which at the time of entry of the order for relief has been named as a defendant
in personal injury, wrongful death, or property-damage actions seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused by
the presence of, or exposure to, asbestos or asbestos-containing products;” 11 U.S.C. §524(g)(B)(i)
15
Primarily, the obstacles include conserving their reputation, funding, and licenses.
16
Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 2045, 2048 (2000)
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Part I provides background necessary to understand the argument’s totality. It introduces
tools used in Chapter 11 mass tort bankruptcies that are important to understand when discussing
sexual abuse cases. Next, it discusses the trust-injunction’s legislative history and considerations
by the court used to justify special treatment of asbestos claimants. Third, part I summarizes the
phenomenon of sexual abuse mass torts and the recent bankruptcies of USA Gymnastics, Boy
Scouts of America, and several Catholic Dioceses.
Part II highlights specific issues sexual abuse mass torts present and argues they are not
properly regarded within the Code’s current framework. 17 Currently, courts must resolve complex
conflicts of interest issues while providing a “fresh start” for the debtor. Proof of claim procedures
sometimes burden sexual assault claimants’ non-financial interests. Bar dates, discovery
limitations, and recovery distribution criteria adopted by the uncodified trusts may impose stricter
standards on claimant-survivors than non-bankruptcy procedure. 18 Un-codified channeling
injunctions lack concrete authority and consistency. Sexual assault mass tort resolution needs the
formal protection of certainty, recognized as a leading factor in codifying § 524(g).
Part III shows how § 524(g) can potentially solve most issues stifling the claimant while
fulfilling some debtor interests. The injunction element is vital to the corporation’s continued
operation. However, it should not apply to individual direct tortfeasors 19, only the corporate
entity. The injunction should be conditioned upon: removal of individual direct tortfeasors from
the corporation; and preventative policies imposed by the board of directors and monitored by a
third party. Non-corporate third-party releases should not apply to individual direct tortfeasors. A

17

Juan Martinez, Sexual Abuse and Bankruptcy: How Organizations Abuse Chapter 11 to Avoid Victims' Demands
for Answers, 37 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 213, 224 (2020)
18
Id. at 233
19
This term is used to describe those who personally sexually assaulted the survivors.
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specialized creditor committee should be appointed to represent the survivors’ interests. The
committee should enjoy discovery powers the current limits of bankruptcy. Claimants defending
their proof of claim should also enjoy broadened discovery powers. Part IV provides
recommendations.

II.

Part I: Background
A. Relevant tools of bankruptcy mass tort law
Mass torts are lawsuits involving numerous claimants who suffered similar acts of harm from

the same defendant. Corporations involved in mass tort litigation may be forced into bankruptcy
due to the inability to satisfy all claims. Once in a bankruptcy proceeding, tort claims are
consolidated and resolved via Chapter 11 reorganization plan. There is debate concerning whether
mass torts are best handled through the bankruptcy process. 20 Several scholars argue that
bankruptcy is an efficient means for mass tort litigation. 21 Others believe the process lacks proper
tools to handle this level of complex litigation.22 Some tools provided by the Bankruptcy Code to
resolve mass torts are the automatic stay, creditor committees, future claims, discovery rules, and
the trust-injunction.

20

Id.
Smith, supra at 1640
22
Id.
21
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1. The Automatic Stay
The automatic stay is one of the most important tools of bankruptcy. 23 The automatic stay
is an immediate temporary injunction staying all debt collection efforts against the debtor. 24
Debtors effectuate the stay by filing a petition in bankruptcy court. The stay includes ongoing
litigation of sexual assault tort claims, regardless of their stage. 25
Interpreted broadly, the automatic stay provides an opportunity to effectively resolve
competing economic interests.26 Interpreted narrowly, the automatic stay affords the debtor a
“breathing spell from the pressures that precipitated its bankruptcy filing and protecting creditors
by promoting the bankruptcy goal of equal treatment.” 27
2. Creditor Committees
Creditor committees are groups of people, appointed by the bankruptcy trustee, who
represent classes of creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. Committees owe a fiduciary duty to the
creditors under its representation.28 Representatives participate in plan negotiation, advise
creditors, and collect and file plan acceptances or rejections. 29 Committees have broad power to
investigate the debtor’s acts, business operations, assets and liabilities. 30

23

Id. at 1640
11 U.S.C. §362(a) “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or
303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970,
operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-- (1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or
could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.”
25
Id.
26
Smith, supra at 1639
27
Id.
28
In re Residential Capital LLC, 480 B.R. 550, 559 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012)
29
11 U.S.C. §1103
30
11 U.S.C. §1103(c)
24
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3. Future Claims
Generally, bankruptcy courts do not adjudicate post-petition causes of action. In every Chapter
11 proceeding, courts establish a bar date. A bar date is a window of fixed time when creditors
may file a claim for consideration of payment from the debtor. 31 Courts may only extend the bar
date for good cause.32 Any claims filed after the bar date are prevented from recovery unless the
claimant presents a valid excuse for their tardiness. If the claimant can not show cause or present
a valid excuse, the claim is categorized as a “latent claim.” Latent claimants’ interests are only
considered after all timely claims are satisfied. 33 Post-petition claimants who suffered harm from
the debtor’s pre-petition conduct may be categorized as future claimants and appointed a future
claims representative (FCR) to advocate for their interests. 34
4. Discovery Procedures
Discovery in bankruptcy proceedings are limited to the financial conduct of the debtor’s
estate.35 In a corporate restructuring, the estate typically includes the company’s officers and
managers.36 Discovery procedures are referred to as examinations in bankruptcy and normally
performed by creditor committees.37 Discovery may not delve into matters unrelated to discovering
31

FRBP 3003(c)(3) “The court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim or
interest may be filed. Notwithstanding the expiration of such time, a proof of claim may be filed to the extent and
under the conditions stated in Rule 3002(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(6).”
32
FRBP 3002(c)(1)
33
Plevin, supra at 275
34
Plevin, supra at 278
35
FBRP 2004 (a) on motion of any party in interest, the court may order the examination of any entity. (b) The
examination of an entity under this rule or of the debtor under § 343 of the Code may relate only to the acts,
conduct, or property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which may affect the
administration of the debtor's estate, or to the debtor's right to a discharge. . . an individual's debt adjustment case
under chapter 13, or a reorganization case under chapter 11 of the Code, other than for the reorganization of a
railroad, the examination may also relate to the operation of any business and the desirability of its continuance, the
source of any money or property acquired or to be acquired by the debtor for purposes of consummating a plan and
the consideration given or offered therefore, and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a
plan.”
36
Martinez, supra at 240
37
Id.
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assets or revealing fraud; but, courts often extend great latitude.38 Examinations may not be used
for the purposes of abuse or harassment. 39
5. Trust-Injunctions
Courts commonly approve trust-injunctions when cases involve future claimants. Trustinjunctions are a dual-system involving a trust and an injunction. A court-created trust disburses
recovery to claimants and assumes future liability. The injunction bars future claims against the
debtor and channels them to the trust. Trusts are funded by the debtors and their insurers. It
distributes payouts per claimants’ applicability to predetermined criteria. 40
Courts have different opinions on whether they possess the authority to administer trustinjunctions. Those who do, rely on their broad equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and a
finding of unusual circumstances.41 There is no bright line test to determine what constitutes
“unusual circumstances” warranting a trust-injunction. However, each court applies some
variation of the considerations expressed in In re Dowing42:
(1) a relationship between the debtor and the third party such that a suit against
the non-debtor is, in essence, a suit against the debtor or capable of depleting
the assets of the estate;
(2) the non-debtor contributed substantial assets to the reorganization;
(3) the injunction is essential to the reorganization;
(4) the majority of the impacted classes has voted to accept the plan;
(5) the plan provides for full or nearly full compensation to all or substantially
all of the impacted classes;
(6) the plan provides an opportunity for non-settling claimants to recover in full;
and
38

Id.
Id.
40
Smith, supra at 1648
41
Silverstein, supra at 14
42
Id. at 15
39
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(7) the court made factual findings in support of these considerations.
6. Non-debtor release
Often proposed in a trust-injunction negotiation is a non-debtor third-party release. Third-party
releases bar creditor claims against non-debtor third parties over the creditor’s objection. 43 Thirdparty releases enjoin creditors from bringing a certain type of claim or absolve the third party from
all liability.44 Authority for third-party releases is not expressly provided in the code and remains
widely disputed, but jurisdictions allowing releases typically justify it because “the benefiting nondebtor is making a financial contribution to the debtor's estate--a contribution that is necessary for
the success of the debtor's reorganization.” 45
B. The Evolution of §524(g)
The trust-injunction mechanism of 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) is modeled after the Chapter 11 plan
of Johns-Manville v. Kane (Manville).46 Johns-Manville Corp. (Manville) was the world’s largest
asbestos producer. Studies done in the 1960s showed asbestos exposure causes respiratory
diseases and cancer. Subsequently, the company became flooded with personal injury and
wrongful death claims. Preliminary estimates of present and future claims reported liabilities of
approximately $2 billion.
The court established a creditor committee to represent personal injury claimants, and
appointed counsel to represent future claimants. Per Judge Lifland, future claimants deserved
representation based on their large quantity and statistical surety of their existence. 47 Future

43

Id. at 21
Id. at 22
45
Macchiarola, supra at 596
46
Kane, 843 F.2d at 650
47
Id. at 646
44
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claimants technically did not have “claims” cognizable under 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), but were still
parties in interest under § 1109(b). Therefore, future claimants were entitled to a voice in the
proceedings.48
Judge Lifland also lifted the bar date requirement. He reasoned that since asbestos related
disease may be undisclosed for up to 30 years or more, a procedure for dealing with future claims
must be addressed.49 Negotiations resulted in a trust consisting of the proceeds from Manville’s
settlements, cash, receivables, insurance, and stock of the reorganized company. 50 To receive
compensation, “victims would submit their claims to a medical screening panel and receive a
predetermined amount for the injury specified with subsequent reevaluation not precluded.” 51 To
ensure asbestos claims would only be asserted against the debtors, the court issued an injunction.
Manville’s trust retained the right to collect twenty percent of the company’s income. Recovery
under the trust required claimants to attempt settlement. If a settlement is not reached the claimant
could elect mediation, arbitration, or traditional 52 tort litigation and the trust would pay the full
amount of compensatory damages.53 Unfortunately, the Manville debtors grossly underestimated
the number of future claimants. They crafted the plan expecting between 83,000 and 100,000
claims, but within a few years over 240,000 claims were filed. Ultimately the trust itself became
insolvent.

48

Id. at 639
Id. at 640
50
Id. at 649
51
Id.
52
In this artcile, “traditional” means “outside of bankruptcy court.” i.e., traditionally, tort claims are not originally
heard in bankruptcy court.
53
Macchiarola, supra at 608
49
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As asbestos-induced bankruptcies exponentially increased, so did the debtors mimicking the
trust-injunction mechanism. However, legal uncertainty around the scheme created doubt
regarding its authoritative validity.54 Congress sought to strengthen the trust-injunction mechanism
and offer certitude to other asbestos trust-injunction schemes that meet similar standards pertaining
to the rights of future claimants.55 Subsequently, they enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
adding subsection (g) to 11 U.S.C. § 524, the law governing effect of discharge. Their stated reason
was: to “preserve the going concern value” of the debtor and provide a source of payment to future
claimants.56
The Act provided statutory authority upholding the validity of the trust-injunction mechanism
as applied to asbestos-induced bankruptcy proceedings and included specific requirements for
confirmation and structure. The newfound authority legitimizes the scheme, allows it to withstand
all challenges, and increases the company’s stock value. Congress believed the company’s value
and stock and stock increase would allow continued contribution the fund. Continued contributions
by the company allows continued recovery for claimants.

54

H.R.Rep. No. 103–835, at 40 (1994), 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349 “. . . lingering uncertainty in the financial
community as to whether the injunction can withstand all challenges has apparently made it more difficult for the
company to meet its needs for capital and has depressed the value of its stock. This has undermined the ‘fresh start’
objectives of bankruptcy and the goals of the trust arrangement.”
55
Id. “[Section 524(g) was adopted “in order to strengthen the Manville and UNR trust/injunction mechanisms and
to offer similar certitude to other asbestos trust/injunction mechanisms that meet the same kind of high standards
with respect to regard for the rights of claimants, present and future, as displayed in the two pioneering cases. The
Committee believes Johns-Manville and UNR were aided in meeting these high standards, in part at least, by the
perceived legal uncertainty surrounding this mechanism, which created strong incentives to take exceptional
precautions at every stage of the proceeding. The Committee has concluded, therefore, that creating greater certitude
regarding the validity of the trust/injunction mechanism must be accompanied by explicit requirements simulating
those met in the Manville case.”
56
Id.
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C. The Phenomenon of Sexual Abuse Mass Torts in Bankruptcy.
Sexual abuse mass torts are becoming a significant occurrence in bankruptcy law. Recent
major sexual-abuse bankruptcies involve the corporations of USA Gymnastics, Boy Scouts of
America., and several Catholic Dioceses. This section will begin with a brief summary of each.
USA Gymnastics (USAG) filed for bankruptcy in December, 2018 due to threats of liability in
sexual abuse disputes against Larry Nassar, a now former national team doctor. Nassar was
accused by over three hundred women and named in over one hundred lawsuits spanning over his
entire career with USAG. Nasar was convicted in 2017 and sentenced to forty to one hundred
twenty-five years in prison by multiple state and federal courts. 57 Subsequently, Nassar’s victims
brought claims against USAG for failing to adequately protect them. 58 The case is currently tied
up in litigation pertaining to insurer liability.59
Boy Scouts of America (BSA) filed for Bankruptcy in 2018 amidst a wave of two hundred and
seventy-five pending state and federal sexual abuse related claims. 60 BSA projected approximately
one thousand seven hundred future claims, initiating their Chapter 11 petition. 61 BSA filed a
reorganization plan using a trust-injunction to satisfy claims. The plan creates a trust named the

57

Who is Larry Nassar? A timeline of his decades-long career, sexual assault convictions and prison sentences,
USA Today (last updated Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/pages/interactives/larry-nassar-timeline/.
58
Sexual Assault Civil Statutes of Limitations by State, FindLaw.com (last updated Dec. 3, 2018)
https://www.findlaw.com/injury/torts-and-personal-injuries/sexual-assault-civil-statutes-of-limitations-by-state.html
59
Timeline for Key Motions and Actions Regarding USA Gymnastics’ bankruptcy case, USA Gymnastics, (Aug. 26,
2020), https://usagym.org/pages/aboutus/pages/bankruptcy.html
60
Corky Siemasko, Lawyer Demands Boy Scouts Open Up the ‘perversion files’, NBC News (Apr. 24, 2019 11:25
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/lawyer-demands-boy-scouts-open-perversion-files-n997786. This
wave stems from the public release of the “ineligible volunteer files” (also known as the “perversion files”),
containing details of over 5,000 cases of sexual abuse allegations against scout masters that were never investigated
or charged criminally. The documents were publicized in Lewis vs. Boy Scouts of America, Case No. 0710-11294.
61
Id.
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“Victim Compensation Trust” funded by local councils, charter organizations, and insurance
proceeds. The injunction prong releases BSA and all affiliate organizations. 62
Since over twenty-five Catholic Dioceses filed for sexual abuse induced bankruptcy, this paper
will briefly highlight specific considerations from some. The case involving the Diocese of
Portland addressed a disclosure issue of documents produced in discovery. The documents were
initially protected by a District court order. The documents contained names and addresses of
Priests accused of sexual assault. The Bankruptcy court directed release of the documents and the
Ninth Circuit Court of appeals affirmed. The court held: “disclosure of an abuser's identity was
only permissible where the public safety interest of protecting children from potential abuse
demonstrably outweighed the alleged abuser's privacy interest, for example, when the abuser
remained active as a priest or otherwise posed a threat to children. Otherwise, the abuser's identity
would not be disclosed where there had been no showing of risk to the community.” 63
The Diocese of Harrisburg bankruptcy is a pioneer case filed in February 2020. It is the first
diocese to file for bankruptcy resulting from the Grand Jury investigation published in 2018. The
investigation revealed sexual abuse allegations against over three hundred priests from six
dioceses, and over one thousand identifiable child victims.64 Per the report, the dioceses knew the
abuse was occurring and actively contained the scandal. 65

62

The “affiliate organizations” include local councils, boards committees, related entities, and charter organizations.
In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 408 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1867, 182 L. Ed. 2d 645 (2012).
64
Report I of the 40th Statewide Grand Jury, July 27, 2018, available at www.attorneygeneral.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/A-Report-of-the-Fortieth-Statewide-Investigating-Grand-Jury_Cleland-Redactions-8-1208_Redacted.pdf (“There have been other reports about child sex abuse within the Catholic Church. But never on
this scale. For many of us, those earlier stories happened someplace else, someplace away. Now we know the truth:
it happened everywhere .... We subpoenaed, and reviewed, half a million pages of internal diocesan documents.
They contained credible allegations against over three hundred predator priests. Over one thousand child victims
were identifiable, from the church's own records.”).
65
Id.
63
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The Oregon Province of the Society of Jesus also required public disclosure of names of priests
identified as abusers. In 2015, a bankruptcy court in Wisconsin confirmed a plan of reorganization
submitted by the Archdiocese of Milwaukee. The bankruptcy settled three hundred thirty sexual
abuse claims. There were five hundred seventy-nine sexual abuse claims filed against the church
in total. The trust only serviced present substantiated claimants. It provided eight million dollars
towards the settlement and established a five hundred thousand dollar therapy fund for victims. 66
The Christian Brothers Institute (CBI) filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in the Southern District
of NY. CBI settled after a court-supervised mediation on a trust-injunction. CBI and its insurers
funded the trust with sixteen-million-dollars. The injunction barred CBI from further liability. The
settlement did not bar claimants from actions against insurers, schools, or dioceses. The bar date
for “future claimants” was set for five to eight months after confirmation of the plan depending on
the type of harm suffered. The Catholic Diocese of Rochester, Archbishop of Agana, and Diocese
of Santa Fe, are all currently in mediation pertaining to insurance disputes, despite petitions filed
in 2018 and prior.67

66

In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 523 B.R. 655 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014)
George R. Calhoun, Mediation and A Lack of Transparency in Mass Tort Cases, 39 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 26,64
(2020)
67
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III.

Part II - Sexual Abuse Survivors, Like Asbestos Victims, Should Be Afforded Special
Protections In Bankruptcy Proceedings.

Corporate reorganization law tries to balance fairness and flexibility.

68

When flexible

application of the code shows signs of undue unfairness, the bankruptcy code will adopt
amendments and strictly apply its rules.69 The code adopted Section 524(g) to fairly resolve some
of the prejudices parties face in asbestos-related bankruptcies. Claimants harmed by asbestos
exposure faced life threatening illnesses.70There is no feasible way to trace asbestos exposure to
prevent it. New harm will continue decades after manufacturers stop producing asbestos products.
At the time the court resolved pioneer asbestos cases, the Code only dealt with present claims
and acts committed prior to filing for bankruptcy. Asbestos cases were unique because acts were
committed prior to filing, but a significant amount of harm would manifest after the bankruptcy
ended. Thus, the corporation would be forced to litigate thousands of claims pushing the company
into insolvency. Consequently, individuals with legitimate personal injury or wrongful death
claims would be left with no recovery.
Due to the magnitude of the harm and unfairness in the current resolution process, courts
recognized that future personal injury claims should have access to recovery and a voice in the
proceedings Debtor-manufacturers deserved the ability to reorganize. Congress believed these
special interests warranted firm protection by the code and enacted an amendment providing
concrete authority for new protective procedures.

68

Stephen J. Lubben, Fairness And Flexibility: Understanding Corporate Bankruptcy’s Arc, 23 U. Pa. J. of Bus. Aff.
132, 134 (2020)
69
Id.
70
Daniel King, What is asbestos and how does it cause cancer?, Asbestos.com (last visited April 19, 2021),
https://www.asbestos.com/asbestos/
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Parties to sexual abuse mass tort bankruptcies have special interests similar to those in asbestos
bankruptcies. Some special interests in sexual abuse mass tort bankruptcies are more complex than
those considered by Congress designing § 524(g) and safeguarded in other areas of law. Therefore,
special protections in sexual abuse mass tort bankruptcies are warranted and should be afforded in
the same manner as asbestos-related bankruptcies. This section argues that sexual abuse claimants
deserve their own codified section in the bankruptcy code by outlining prejudices faced due to
conflicts of interests, proof of claims procedure, discovery limitations, and lack of authority.
A. Conflicts of Financial and Non-financial Interests.
Sexual abuse claimants have important non-financial interests that conflict with their own
financial interests and those of the debtor. Claimants seek public accountability and the power of
telling their story uncontested.71
In USA Gymnastics, the survivors, many of whom were financially stable professional
gymnasts, explained the main point of suing USAG was to get to the truth. Monetary compensation
was insufficient to make them “whole again,” for many of them will endure lifelong therapy and
mental anguish. Claimant’s interest in accountability conflicts with the debtor’s ability to achieve
a “fresh start,” one of the core principles of corporate reorganization. Debtors in recent sexual
abuse mass torts are nonprofit, charitable or religious organizations; meaning, they are financially
dependent on donations or other public funding. Increasing revelations of sexual abuse occurrences

71

Martinez, supra at 221. Even plaintiffs in Purdue, a case involving corporate liability for drug addiction which is
arguably less invasive than sexual assault, objected to a settlement proposal because it did not include any admission
of wrongdoing or liability and they believed the “story of what happened here really needs to be told.”
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will discourage donors from contributing to the organization, substantially impacting the
organization’s main source of income.72
In fact, the USAG bankruptcy put the organization’s Olympic eligibility at risk. 73 Olympic
eligibility was the organization’s most competitive asset. Gymnasts aspiring to attend the
Olympics will turn to an Olympic eligible organization. The organization risks a significant drop
in both funding and business. This would cause another bankruptcy, and the organization would
liquidate. If claimants’ interest in public accountability is met, and the corporation’s funds are
substantially depleted, no money is left to disburse damages. damages pay for medical expenses,
therapy, attorney’s fees, and other costs related to abuse. This presents a direct conflict of interests
between the claimants’ own financial and non-financial interests.
Consequently, recovery funding will rely heavily on contributions from insurers. Insurers
present a significant obstacle in the bankruptcy process because they frequently have legitimate
coverage defenses relieving them of liability for sexual abuse torts. 74 They often tie up resolution
efforts with adversary proceedings that exhaust claimants within and outside of the bankruptcy.
Survivors within the bankruptcy experience postponed recovery. Survivors outside the bankruptcy
experience prolonged discovery proceedings. Lengthy discovery is detrimental to sexual abuse
plaintiffs because certain discovery findings lose emphasis and reliability with time. 75 In asbestos
cases, there was only one layer of conflicting interests: future claimants’ compensation, and the
corporation’s ability to compensate claims and continue operating. The Code provides for those

72

i.e., loss of sponsorships, decrease in donations, decrease in participation, etc.
Juliet Macur, Olympic Committee Moves to Revoke U.S.A. Gymnastics’ Governing Rights, The New York Times
(Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/sports/usa-gymnastics-usoc.html
74
Id. at 65
75
Martinez, supra at 250. For example, witnesses become less credible over time because the memory is further
away, injuries that are visible at one point may heal and be less convincing overtime, etc.
73
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interests by requiring the trust to provide reasonable assurance that they can pay present and future
claims in the same manner.76 If the Code identifies the interests in protecting recovery for future
claimants in asbestos cases important enough to codify, then the complicated interests of sexual
abuse claimants should be regarded and protected in the same manner.
B. Proof of claims
Proof of claim procedures may impose burden on the claimant by enforcing strict standards of
proof and timing. Bar dates set time limits to file claims. But, numerous legitimate circumstances
may prevent timely filing. Trends in other areas of law create exceptions for sexual assault
survivors that expand time for claims filing. The only exception provided in the bankruptcy process
does not effectively protect survivors from prejudice.
Once a Chapter 11 petition is filed, creditors must file a proof of claim within a time period set
by the court, This period is commonly referred to as the “bar date.” 77 The claimant bears the burden
of establishing a valid claim and must assert facts sufficient for a legal basis. 78 If the debtor objects
they may submit a motion for summary judgment to litigate threshold issues that apply to all or
some of the asserted claims.79

76

11 U.S.C. §524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V), in order for the court to confirm a plan resolving asbestos mass torts, the trust
must provide reasonable assurance that they will be able to pay present and future claims in the same manner.
77
FRBP Rule 3003(c)(3) The court shall fix and for cause shown may extend the time within which proofs of claim
or interest may be filed. Notwithstanding the expiration of such time, a proof of claim may be filed to the extent and
under the conditions stated in Rule 3002(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), and (c)(6).
78
Id. §502(b)
79
11 U.S.C. §502(a) A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, is deemed allowed,
unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a general partner in a partnership that is a debtor in a case under
chapter 7 of this title, objects.
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Bar dates for sexual abuse bankruptcy cases typically range from three to nine months after
petition filing.80 The generosity of these extended filing periods show Bankruptcy Courts generally
use their Rule 3003(c)(3) discretion in favor of sexual abuse claimants. Still, bar dates may
prejudice claimants whose resolution is best sought through the bankruptcy system. 81
Bar dates affect claimants differently depending on the claimant and resolution process. Prepetition claimants well within the state-imposed statute of limitations period may be rushed to
filing a proof of claim within the bar date. If a pre-petition claimant misses the bar date, they must
either petition the court to allow their claim “for cause,” or commence action in state court. 82 If
the claimant goes forward with the “for cause” defense they must provide a good reason for their
lateness.
Claims may even become subject to the automatic stay if they file in state court after failing to
provide a “for cause” showing. If the bankruptcy results in pre-petition discharge of unscheduled
claims the late claimant risks recovery entirely. If the bankruptcy results in an uncodified trustinjunction mechanism, the late claimant loses the ability to equally negotiate on their own behalf.
If the claimant is still allowed to bring suit in state court, access to fresh discovery will be diluted,
along. The recovery pool is also diluted since most of the corporation’s assets and funds were
distributed within the bankruptcy.
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Sexual abuse survivors suffer varying psychological effects that may account for late filing.
Survivors who dealt with trauma by burying the memory, were too young to remember vividly, or
become shocked upon notice of the ability to recover, may need time to mentally prepare. 83 If so,
their ability to file a claim is at the discretion of a judge. Claimants with limited evidence are also
prejudiced by proof of claims procedures. Once a proof of claim is filed and executed, the debtor
has the right to object by producing evidence to rebut the claimant’s prima facie claim.84 If rebuttal
is successful, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant to produce additional evidence of the
claim’s validity based on a preponderance of the evidence. 85 Ultimately, the claimant has the
burden of proof to support their claim.
In sexual assault cases, proof is not always readily available, and its discovery may even occur
during the bankruptcy, after the bar date. Prior to BSA filing for bankruptcy, a lone negligence
case prompted the release of the “perversion files,” a record kept by the organization of alleged
sexual abuse allegations and details that were never investigated or turned over to the court. 86 A
two-year grand jury investigation uncovered evidence of sexual assault of over one thousand
survivors, implicating over three hundred priests. 87 Evidence of sexual assault was also uncovered
during an investigation into an organization’s claims valuation procedure. 88 The survivors in these
cases may have been precluded from filing proof of claims before the evidence was uncovered due
to lack of proof rendering them unable to support their claims. The evidence uncovered during the
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bankruptcy may provide enough support for their claim, but, the bar date prevents them from filing.
Though the new evidence would provide a “for cause” reason to allow for late filing, a plethora of
procedure must be administered prior. 89
In a civil sexual abuse case, most states’ statutes of limitations are one to seven years from the
act.90 However, numerous states allow statutes of limitations periods to begin at the time of
discovery rather than the date of the incident. 91 Most states with fixed statute of limitations periods
contain exceptions that also allow for flexible filing times depending on the type of harm or
victim.92 Bar dates act contrarily to the trend of other courts. Bar dates significantly limit filing
times for sexual abuse claimants. Other courts allow at least twice as long to file actions for the
same offense.
The Code allows for asbestos claims to continue indefinitely. It recognizes the injustices bar
dates pose on their special claimants but makes no official considerations for sexual abuse
claimants. Asbestos claimants are afforded indefinite filing times due to the nature of asbestosrelated diseases. Specifically, since the harm caused by asbestos exposure can affect individuals
after the bankruptcy for an unquantifiable period of time, it would be unfair to bar recovery based
on timing. In sexual abuse cases, like asbestos cases, the effects of pre-petition harm can manifest
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itself at any time. Factors like trauma induced memory loss, dissociative amnesia, or discovery of
sexually transmitted diseases are impossible to control or predict. 93
C. Discovery limitations on proof of claims
Proof of claims procedure also presents obstacles to evidence. If the debtor in a sexual abuse
bankruptcy successfully challenges a proof of claim, the burden of proof ultimately falls on the
claimant.94 The issue is disputed and resolved by the bankruptcy court, therefore it is subject to the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP). Discovery in bankruptcy proceedings are limited
to the financial affairs of the debtor pursuant to FRBP 2004(3). 95
Creditor committees are given the power to investigate debtors, but may only examine conduct
relating to their property, liabilities and financial conditions for the purpose of “unearthing
fraud.”96 Committees are often granted latitude in their discovery powers, but the examinations
must always relate back to unearthing fraud or discovering assets. 97
Some creditor committees have been able to uncover sufficient evidence of sexual misconduct
despite discovery limitations. For example, survivors in the Archbishop of Portland’s bankruptcy,
were able to uncover confidential documented accounts of sexual abuse, kept and intentionally
hidden by the diocese, through examination of their projected liability process. Survivors in the
Diocese of Harrisburg’s bankruptcy uncovered evidence of decades of abuse after a two-year grand
jury investigation conducted prior to the bankruptcy filing. Survivors in the USAG bankruptcy
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obtained evidence through Larry Nassar’s criminal proceedings conducted prior to the bankruptcy.
Still, discovery limitations present significant obstacles in the claimants’ ability to substantiate
their claims.
This issues poses a significant concern because there is conflicting law on whether sexual
abuse judgments are sufficient as proofs of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding where the
confirmation plan includes an uncodified trust-injunction mechanism. 98 There are jurisdictions
where, upon the debtor’s objection and successful rebut of a prima facie claim, a civil judgment is
not enough to support a survivor’s proof of claim; and discovery to obtain the requisite evidence
is limited to financially related conduct. This proof of claims issue poses two substantial obstacles:
a higher burden of proof than traditional procedures, and restricted opportunity to obtain proof.
Though satisfactory proof was obtained in other cases, proof of claims procedure often places
considerable burdens on sexual abuse claimants.
Asbestos claimants do not share the same issue. Asbestos claimants prove their asbestos
related injuries with medical records and manufacturer advertising. Sexual assault allegations are
not as cut and dry. They require inquiry and investigation into the actors’ conduct, personal lives,
and experiences.

98

Cathy Ta, Sexual Harassment Civil Judgments in Bankruptcy, Best Best & Krieger Attorneys at Law (May 23,
2018), https://www.bbklaw.com/news-events/insights/2018/authored-articles/05/sexual-harassment-civil-judgmentsin-bankruptcy

22

D. Discovery limitations on negotiations.
Creditor committees must contribute to the plan and negotiate on behalf of the unsecured
creditors. Part of that negotiation is usually conditions the plan on reformative and preventative
measures for the company. Effective measures must be tailored to the root of the problem.
Bankruptcy discovery limitations prevent committees from uncovering the root of the problem
by requiring investigations only into the financial aspect of the company–a surface level inquiry.
Effective preventative measures are important in sexual abuse bankruptcies because it is the only
way to achieve an effective reorganization, true “fresh start.” Obviously, these corporations can
not aptly provide these measures themselves or else they would not succumb to a mass tort
bankruptcy. Still, the debtor has a significant interest in providing for, preventing, and limiting
liability to future claims.
Crafting specially tailored reformative measures for companies plagued by sexual abuse
culture is in the best interest of all parties: it effectively limits the debtor’s chance of recurrence
and liability; serves the claimants’ interest in creating a safe environment; provides a bargaining
chip for present claimants; and may prevent harm to others. The same discovery rules that limit
claimants’ ability to support challenged proof of claims also restricts the creditor committee’s
ability to condition settlement on reformative measures. Though committees are afforded wide
latitude in their discovery powers, the Code’s restrictions block inquiry into the actual conduct of
sexual abuse. It is nearly impossible to track down how the abuse continued without a full
investigation into the company.
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If the committee is unable to trace the enabling measures of the organization, they cannot craft
preventative safeguards for a meaningful reorganization plan that cure all areas of the company
contributing to the ongoing abuse.99
Sexual abuse survivors are provided special protections in other areas of law and policy, These
measures speak to survivors’ unique need for safeguards in discovery dating back decades. “Rape
shield laws” were a collection of legislation aimed to protect the identify of rape accusers from the
media.100 Though the original laws were later held unconstitutional under the First amendment,
state legislators have adopted a constitutional version of rape shield laws in every state. 101
Remnants of rape shield laws are even found in the Federal Rules of Evidence(FRE). The FRE
prevents evidence of past sexual behavior or sexual predisposition in criminal proceedings
involving sexual misconduct.102 The continuance of rape shield laws shows a universal
understanding in law that sexual abuse victims must be handled with care. The appearance of
privacy protections in rules that govern discovery issues like confidentiality and evidence
admissibility show that special protections for sexual abuse survivors in discovery practices are
common.103
Discovery limited to financially-related aspects of the company is an appropriate safeguard for
mass tort debtors whose torts are more facially realizable, like asbestos manufacturers advertising
asbestos products.
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Financially restricted discovery is inadequate when the act is as embedded into the company
as the sexual abuse mass torts discussed in this article. These organizations do not have simple
processes and systems that can be corrected and monitored with a simple layer of security. They
have turned sexual abuse into a norm and created a “culture of silence” through shame, conflicts
of interests, and a lack of transparency. 104 Even in the aforementioned examples105 of proof of
sexual misconduct unveiled during the bankruptcy process, the bankruptcy code does not directly
provide for further inquiry into the circumstances surrounding those incidents. Those
circumstances are the key to preventative reform for organizations where the issue is not in a
system seen through the lens of financial processes, but a culture of subtle actions and silent
policies. This poses another setback that sexual abuse claimants face and asbestos claimants do
not.
The actions of manufacturers that created asbestos-related harm is clear and simple.
Preventative measures are consequently clear and simple–stop using asbestos. 106 To comply,
manufacturers must only find alternative means of supplying their products and conduct routine
quality checks. Corporations in sexual abuse bankruptcies have a much higher hurdle to overcome
sexual abuse enabling. Especially if the organization has been battling with sexual abuse practices
for decades like the Boy Scouts or the dioceses. Unlike asbestos manufacturers who were openly
and legally manufacturing asbestos. Corporations in sexual abuse cases operate for an unrelated
purpose and the sexual abuse occurred “under the radar.” Therefore, a deeper level of discovery is
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necessary to uncover the corporation’s enabling qualities and condition reorganization on their
cure.
E. Lack of Authority
Courts have not officially recognized any form of governance that provides the authority
to create a trust-injunction. The legality of the plan is vulnerable to differing interpretations of
authority breeding varying outcomes that go against the courts’ policy of uniformity, transparency,
and equity. Courts in early asbestos cases and current sexual abuse bankruptcies rely on the
“equitable injunctive powers of bankruptcy courts under § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code” to enforce
the channeling injunction mechanism.
After the Manville decision, litigants challenged the authority of the court to issue the
injunction107. In fact, Congress expressly stated that § 524(g) was enacted to quiet those
challenges.108 Courts using uncodified channeling injunctions face a similar issue today.109 By
expressly establishing the courts’ authority in a new provision to the code that only applies to one
specific type of case, Congress opened the door for doubt in the court’s authority to establish a
trust-injunction in other cases. Congress may have retroactively worsened the strength of nonasbestos related trust-injunctions, increasing skepticism of its application in sexual abuse cases.
Validity of a recovery scheme is particularly meaningful in sexual assault bankruptcies
inherently involving victims of heinous crimes and limited alternative means of recovery. Lack of
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authority creates a lack of guidance. Not only are parties left uncertain of the validity of a creative
reorganization plan, but they are also unclear of the standards to support it. Prior to enactment of
524(g), asbestos cases fiddled with trust-injunction requirements. For example, debtors were
unclear of the level of compensation a trust must prove its capable of providing claimants postconfirmation.
In Manville, the court found (mistakenly, as it turned out) that the trusts established for the
payment of asbestos-related personal injury claims would be adequate to pay those claims. In
Robins, the court estimated the aggregate of Dalkon Shield claims at $2.45 billion and required
that any plan adequately provide for the payment of claims in that amount. In Finley Kumble’s
bankruptcy, although the full payment of claims ultimately proved infeasible in confirming the
plan, the court found that creditors were receiving distributions in excess of what they would
receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor and its partners. 110
In sexual assault cases, the trust-injunction mechanism faces similar issues. Courts differ on
the standard required to issue a trust-injunction.111 Most courts use the five factor test expressed
in Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc.,112 but, like early mass tort cases, there remains no definitive
standard governing which cases warrant a trust-injunction. Meaning, no existing authority
solidifies the right of future sexual assault claimants to recovery. Lack of authority governing
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whether the uncodified trust-injunction mechanism is valid also created conflicting authority of
what satisfies a sexual abuse proof of claim. Traditionally, corporations may not receive discharges
in bankruptcy. However, the injunction prong of the trust-injunction mechanism creates the “effect
of discharge.” This opens the door for arguments on whether sexual abuse judgments are sufficient
as proofs of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding per discharge rules. If the court refuses to
substantiate the claim based on their litigated civil judgment, a survivor with a legally valid claim
will walk away meritless.
Non-debtor releases also threaten survivors due to lack of guidance stemming from lack of
authority. Since third party releases are based on broad interpretation of a statute, there is no
concrete authority governing who qualifies. This flexibility is capable of exculpating a major
tortfeasor responsible for facilitating the conduct inducing the bankruptcy. Congress established
specific guidelines in § 524(g) for non-debtor releases, recognizing the need to regulate benefitting
parties.113 Sexual abuse cases need structure for regulating third-party releases.
The companies involved in recent sexual-abuse related bankruptcies allowed the conduct to
continue for decades. Common sense supports the assumption that long-term, widespread sexual
abuse does not normally go unnoticed by related parties. 114 Parties whose relationship to the
tortfeasor is close enough to absolve them of liability in a third-party release are not normally
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innocent of some form of negligence.115 For example, the BSA’s confirmation plan raised
suspicions about third-party liability. The plan releases BSA and substantially every BSAaffiliated organization, including the reorganized BSA, the “Future Claimants’ Representative,”
the Local Councils and their board committees, related non-debtor BSA entities and contributing
chartered organizations. In addition, the plan includes an exculpation provision in favor of the
debtors and the reorganized debtors.116
In a case concerning asbestos liability, there is only one clear reason why a company requests
non-debtor release from liability – to protect their monetary assets from exposure to future claims.
But, in sexual abuse cases, third-parties risk civil judgment, federal investigations, criminal
prosecution of directors and officers, and even public shaming. Allowing those parties to escape
liability without even a proper standard for who or how, worsens the risk to the victims of
deprivation of justice and other non-financial interests. In the worst-case scenario, it may allow
the abuse culture to continue by protecting its enablers or participants.
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IV.

Recommendations

Section 524(g) of the bankruptcy code should be amended to include sexual abuse claims and
include added subsections in furtherance of those protections. The new amendments will maintain
the trust-injunction mechanism and its existing terms and requirements, impose additional
conditions on the surviving company, 117
New amendments will protect the debtors’ interest of maintaining the organization. Some of
the corporations involved in recent sexual abuse mass tort bankruptcy are coveted institutions with
decades of history. Though acts of sexual abuse should never be tolerated, and the organizations
failed their duty to protect survivors, it may be in the best interests of all parties to navigate the
restructuring based on the individuals at fault rather than the entire entity. Some scholars argue the
“prolonged nature of the abuse can only realistically occur where is widespread negligence, lack
of adequate protections, and a refusal to seriously investigate claims of abuse.”
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destroying institutions (presumably) built on good intentions, the bankruptcy code should mandate
safeguards to facilitate better practices and preventative measures moving forward. The code
provides a laundry list of requirements a debtor must satisfy to assume the benefits of §524(g),
imposing conditions on the plan itself, terms for the trust, classification of future claimants 119, and
acceptable third-party relationships qualifying for non-debtor release.
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Congress should amend §524(g)(2)(B), to include a third section that imposes conditions on
the surviving organization. The conditions should require: (1) the individuals responsible be
removed or replaced through a transparent process; (2) preventative policies put in place and
monitored by a third party approved by the court; (3) the corporation cooperates in litigation
against the tortfeasors upon court order; (4) removal of individual tortfeasors and parties directly
involved in actions of sexual misconduct by participation, encouragement, willful blindness, or
gross negligence from the organization indefinitely, and findings of such conduct be turned over
to the third party in charge of supervising the preventative policies. 120
Maintaining the organizations in the interest of preserving the integrity of long-standing
institutions, allowing operations to fund recovery, and providing a fresh start, must also be realized
by upholding the third-party release and adding clarifying conditions that protect victims. Nondebtor releases may exculpate potentially guilty parties without a fair investigation into culpability
due to restricted discovery. Section §524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(IV), interpreted broadly, may allow a debtor
to include an unobvious tortfeasor within the terms of the injunction.121 On the other hand, nondebtor releases may be vital to reviving the corporation and offer a strong bargaining chip for the
claimants.122
The issue lies in the lack of authority and conflicting judicial implementation of third-party
releases. Courts have cited both §524(g) and §105(a) as authority for allowing third-party releases
because neither provides clear and concrete authority to do so. Lack of concrete authority reduces
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stock value in the company – a vital characteristic of non-profit organizations tied up in sexual
abuse mass torts.
For example, the US Olympic Committee (USOC) threatened to revoke recognition of USGA
as the sport’s national governing body amidst the sexual abuse claims. USOC voluntarily stayed
the revocation process upon completion of the bankruptcy proceedings. Though their motives
probably include high moral values, they likely seek to avoid future liability. If USGA loses its
Olympic status, hundreds of hopeful gymnasts may be deprived of the ability to compete or
subjected to assimilating to the norms of an entirely different organization. Obtaining a non-debtor
third party release for USOC quiets their liability concerns and allows USGA to maintain its status
for the sake of existing Olympic gymnasts and rebuild its legacy.
In Purdue Pharma, the issue of non-debtor release was challenged when the court administered
a preliminary injunction to enjoin creditor’s lawsuits against the Sackler family, the company’s
owners.123 The creditors challenged the court’s authority to enjoin non-debtors, arguing they
abused their §105(a) discretions in doing so.

124

The court held they did not abuse discretion

because the second circuit previously upheld third-party releases where the injunction plays an
important part in the debtor’s estate and satisfies a four-factor test. 125 Recently, the parties’ dispute
over non-debtor releases turns to their appearance in the plan itself. The Judge stated in the opinion
that the injunction provides a crucial incentive that “could seriously threaten the global settlement,
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an essential ingredient to any confirmable reorganization plan,” if taken off the table. 126 But, some
creditors representing government entities reject use of the injunction to protect the Sacklers
because it relieves them of accountability and a substantial portion of their personal fortune in
tact.127 If states and cities don’t sign off on the settlement, they risk losing any potential payout in
the bankruptcy because their claims would be diluted by the Justice Department, according to the
objection.128 Risk of losing the injunction prompted the Sacklers to voluntarily contribute their
personal finances to the asset pool, but their settlement agreement still received negative criticisms
by public officials for lack of accountability.129
The circumstances surrounding Purdue and USAG are perfect examples of the necessity of the
release – it provides debtor-tortfeasors with an incentive to negotiate and the opportunity to
reorganize on better terms. As the court in Purdue expressed, third parties can seriously threaten
the reorganization.130 Especially in sexual abuse cases where the debtor is usually a non-profit
organization whose ability to fund the plan would solely rest on insurers and donative funding. 131
Litigation between debtors and insurers are tying up sexual assault bankruptcy claims with liability
related adversary proceedings.132 Half of the issues addressed can be avoided or handled swiftly
by additions to 524(g)(4).
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Parties should be given a conduct-based opportunity of liability release. Section 524(g)(4)
explain who may be released but not when. Non-debtor parties should only be prevented from
receiving a third-party release if the conduct act risk of tying them to the claim amounts to liability
of negligence or less. Tortfeasors whose conduct amounts to more than negligence do not deserve
a permanent injunction, and parties who were merely negligent or de jure liable should be able to
qualify for non-debtor release. The code should state that eligibility for third-party release does
not mandate it, only allows for parties to consider it in the plan. These provisions provide both the
authority to enact third-party releases, and clarity to what qualifies.
The code should also include a discovery exception for broader investigation into sexual
abuse claims by the creditor committee based on the principles illustrated by FRE 412 and rape
shield laws133. The committee already retains the power to investigate and rule 2004 is flexible if
interpreted broadly.134 Instead of relying on individual interpretation of discovery procedures, the
court should apply those in the federal rules of civil procedure and federal rules of evidence when
considering sexual assault cases. They provide a great framework with reasonable restrictions and
will not prejudice ongoing litigation.
Lastly, the court must expressly state that section 524(g) is the sole means for providing
for asbestos or sexual abuse mass tort claims. Codification only achieves its intended purpose of
concrete authority if the terms are unambiguous. Congress should amend 524(g) to include sexual
assault claims, and express that it is the sole means of recovery, in order to best regulate the debtors
and rid pending uncertainties regarding its application. The court in In re Energy Future Holdings
Co., recognized that establishing a litigation trust under §524(g) of the code was not the only means
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for providing due process for unknown claimants in a bankruptcy case. 135 According to the court,
a plan like the one in Energy Future does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution by discharging latent asbestos claims if, for example, there is a fundamentally fair
process for reinstating those claims post-confirmation. 136 Here, the debtors argued that future
claimants may meaningfully appeal their claims under rule 3003(3) allowing latent claims to be
instated for cause.137 However, that undermines the purpose of structuring 524(g). Leaving the
statute without precise language establishing its required use dilutes the court’s ability to
meaningfully provide for future claimants.

V.

Conclusion

Sexual assault victims deserve the protections of a codified trust-injunction recovery model.
The scheme presented in section 524(g) creates the perfect framework if it can be amended to
expand its application to sexual assault cases, broaden discovery rules, and place use of the
injunction and third-party release on conditional behavior that safeguards the claimants.
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